Romania’s perception of Finland’s participation in CSCE

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Abstract: Romania and Finland showed a great interest towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Sometimes they have found each other on similar positions in this respect, other times they were suspicious about their mutual projects and intentions. Interested in Romanian-Finnish relations during the CSCE years from the perspective of small states’ capacity or intention to deal with their place in a bipolar system, I came to the conclusion that small states’ foreign policy cannot be interpreted or analyzed without taking into consideration among other factors the actors’ perceptions of the external environment. In this particular case, Romania’s attitude towards Finland in the CSCE (and not only) has been influenced or determined in a great extent by the way Romanian decision makers perceived Finland’s place and role in the international system. This paper aims to identify Romanian decision makers’ perceptions of Finland’s foreign policy, Finland’s neutrality and Finland’s interest in the CSCE, on the basis of some new documents from the Romanian archives. These perceptions are also influenced by the way Romanian leaders interpreted the system of the international relations of that moment and her place and interests in the system.

Résumé: La Roumanie et la Finlande ont été très intéressées de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (CSCE). De temps en temps elles ont eu les mêmes opinions en se qui concerne le rôle de la Conférence, d`autres fois elles ont eu suspicieuses envers les projets de l` autre partie. Etant intéressée des relations d` entre Roumanie et Finlande pendant CSCE de l` opinion des petits pays, je suis arrivée á la conclusion que le politique externe de ces pays ne peut pas être analysé ou interprété, sans tenir compte comment ils ont perçu le milieu externe. En ce cas l` attitude de la Roumanie envers de Finlande pendant CSCE, et pas seulement, a été influencé ou déterminé par le moyen comme les leaders roumaines ont perçu le rôle et le lieu de Finlande dans le système international. Cet article identifie les perceptions que les leaders roumaines les ont eu sur le politique externe de Finlande, la neutralité et ses effets en CSCE á travers des nouveaux documentes d` archive roumaine. La Roumanie et ses leaders ont perçu la Finlande et ca attitude pendant CSCE en tenant compte des relations d`entre Finlande et l`Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes. Quoique au commencement les Roumains ont été indécis, ne sachant pas quoi est la meilleure attitude envers la Finlande, un instrument soviétique dans leurs yeux, puis cet attitude s’est changée. Pendant CSCE, les Roumains ont commencé regarder la Finlande d` une nouvelle perspective. Ils ont entendu que les relations d` entre Finlande et l` Union Soviétique seront approchés dans le future, mais ils ont accepté aussi l’ idée que la Finlande était un Etat neutre qui pourchassait toucher ses interets et n’était pas un instrument soviétique.

1. Introduction

Very optimistic about the CSCE’s chances of success, Romania had probably the highest expectations from this forum. She hoped that the system of the international relations could be changed through the abolition of the military blocs and/or the acceptance of new international relations’ principles. In this sense her diplomats acted in order to convince and attract other countries to support her points of view and projects in the conference. She considered herself as a defender of all small states’ interests and saw the great powers, USSR and USA as being the ‘other’, interested to decide for the small states or to ‘dictate’ small
states’ behavior. This is the perspective from which Romania was interested in Finland in the first years of the CSCE. Could Finland be a supporter of the Romanian points of view and projects in the CSCE? Is Finland ‘on the other side’, supporting Soviet and American proposals which have been interpreted by Romania as having the only purpose to consecrate their dominance into their sphere of influence? The paper has three main parts: a short presentation of the Finnish post-war foreign policy, Finland’s attitude and interests in the CSCE and Romania’s perception of Finland’s participation and interests in the CSCE.

The studies of the Romanian-Finnish relations during the Cold War years are still at the beginning and they suffer in part for the lack of accessibility to Romanian archive materials. Thus, the conclusions of the paper are not final, since the research is in an incipient phase and there is a great deal of archive materials still waiting to be researched.

2. Short characterization of Finland’s foreign policy

After the WWII, in Finland the decisive security problem that was considered to be a question of national security was the relations with the Soviet Union. During the 1940s, President Paasikivi proceeded from the assumption that the survival of Finland and her military security could not rest on a power-based alignment against the Soviet Union, but on the adjustment of security interests of Finland with those of the USSR, especially as to safeguarding the Soviet northwestern border. Maintenance of the right to self determination and sovereignty had to be adjusted to the primary instrument for this end: good and confidential Finnish-Soviet bilateral relations. Another primary instrument of Finnish policy was non-interference in the super-power conflicts. In the foreign policy doctrines of Finland and USSR, as well as in the background views on international relations which make up the most basic premises of foreign policy action the elements of physical protection, of survival and psychological security constituted the core. (H. Kyröläinen, 1981: 222-245).

The Finnish foreign policy has been shaped by Finland’s relationship with her Eastern neighbor. In this context there are some generally identifiable phases in Finnish foreign relations. The years of the war, and those preceding them, were negative in terms of Finnish-Soviet relations. The period 1945-1956 included the return of Soviet-leased Porkkala Naval base to Finland and Finland’s membership in the Nordic Council and the United Nations. This was a positive period. The 1956-1964 period, may be seen as a set-back in Finnish-Soviet relations and included such event as “the night frost” and the “note crisis” in relations with the Soviet Union. The early sixties brought again a period of positive stabilization of foreign relations including Finland’s association with EFTA and the Finnish-Soviet lease agreement concerning the Saimaa Canal. This period of increasingly stable relations then provided the basis for the initiation of the more active current period of Finnish neutrality (N. Cutler, I. Heiskanen, 1973: 13-15).

The concept of neutrality as a foreign policy in Finland has evolved over time to include a passive period and a more active period. In the early post-war years of Finnish neutrality (after Finland joined the United Nations and the Nordic Council and after the return of Porkkala by the Soviet Union, all in the years 1955-1956) statements made by responsible spokesmen contained references to the country’s smallness and insignificance, yet in the 1960s there evolved a less modest view in which Finland expressed a willingness to take on a more active role in the brokering of settlements of East-West conflicts. (N. Cutler, I. Heiskanen, 1973: 13-15) After the WWII, Finland has strived to stand aloof from the international alliances. Thus, Finland did not take part in the negotiations held by the other Nordic countries at the end of the 1940s concerning the possible military-political cooperation before Norway and Denmark joint NATO.

Despite a certain change in the Finnish foreign policy, there can be identified a common lasting line, as a core of the Finnish doctrine. Under Paasikivi, elected president in
1945, following Mannerheim, a totally new foreign policy was acquired in Finland, first known under the name “the Paasikivi line”, later “the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line”. Paasikivi’s starting point was that the interest of the Soviet Union towards Finland has always been military-strategic, not by any means economic-ideological. The policy of the Soviet Union towards Finland has always been, according to Paasikivi, a defensive policy. Thus it was important to Finland to arrange her relations with the USSR in such a way that USSR could be assured that Finland would never again join the enemies of the USSR. The basis for the confidence would be built by the friendship between Finland and the USSR and by their cooperation on different fields. The relations between Finland and the Soviet Union concerning the security policy was defined later in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCAT) in 1948, in which it was also agreed about the cooperation on other fields. The FCAT became soon the foundation of the Finnish foreign policy, giving the basis for other external actions of Finland. Although the treaty between Finland and the USSR and the treaties between the USSR and the socialist states have been signed at about the same time, the first differs from the last in some essential points. Thus, an implicit feature of the Finnish external doctrine is neutrality, which in fact, as Paasikivi has already mentioned, might differ to some extent from the former traditional meaning of the term neutrality. The security arrangements stated in the FCAT are felt to clarify and strengthen Finland’s neutral position, although they of course give it at the same time its own special nature. The confidence between Finland and the USSR, the FCAT, neutrality and the aspiration toward increasing international peace and security are the basic factors which have characterized the Finnish thinking in regard to the foreign policy since the 1940s. Depending on the external and the internal stage of development, these basic factors have been emphasized in somewhat varying ways after the Second World War.

In 1956 Finland became a member of the UN. Thus, Finland took a more active part in international actions, especially in the fields of peace and security within the UN. Also at the level of the international security further activation took place, firstly at the Nordic level. In fact the first initiative in Nordic security was made by Finland already in 1952 when Urho Kekkonen, who was a prime minister at that time, stated his desire for increasing Nordic neutrality. During the years 1963-1965 president Kekkonen brought up his initiatives concerning the Nordic nuclear free zone and the non-militarization of the Nordic Callote area. Finland became really active in the late 1960s when the measures towards international peace and reduction of tension became than dominant factors of the Finnish external doctrine. Being the host country for the SALT negotiations and the definite measures taking in arranging the CSCE are the most notable expressions of the new interest.

The increasing external activity was not felt in Finland as being in contradiction with the basic line of the established foreign policy, namely neutrality. The Finnish-Soviet 1948 Treaty assured the inviolability of the frontiers and the security of Finland, then the both parts signed long-term agreements in the field of trade, science and technology, and culture, trade on this basis has continuously grown. Officially it was said that the 1948 treaty assured the principles of mutual respect for each other’s political sovereignty and independence and non-interference in internal affairs, and that these principles are “evidence of the vitality of the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries” (D. Tomaševsky, 1973: 1-5). But, the new relaxation brought a new dimension of the Finnish neutrality. The relaxation of tensions between East and West has created new conditions for action for Finland’s policy of neutrality and has at the same time brought forth new dimensions in the concept of neutrality itself. Consequently, in recent discussions neutrality has been seen above all as an instrument of foreign policy with which Finland can, already in circumstances of peace influence her international political environment to benefit the strengthening of international security and thus reinforce her own security and position as well” (J.-M. Jansson, 1974: 25). As the minister of

### 3. Finland’s interest in the CSCE

There can be largely identified two phases in Finland’s attitudes towards the convocation of the CSCE. A first one, until the spring of the 1969, period in which Finland considered natural the small states to be practically left outside the discussions concerning a possible European security conference and those discussions to be carried out between the great powers, and a second phase, after the spring of the 1969, when Finland became very active in promoting the opening of the conference. Initially, externally, Finland has not taken any stand in the substance of a conference, although internally the Finnish government was preoccupied with finding a generally acceptable method for the preparation and organization of a security conference. Finland was also avoiding in being completely integrated among the neutrals, as there was difficult to formulate a common policy for the neutrals. Some of the neutrals were more involved in the substance of a security conference and had thus chosen to be more out-spoken about European issues. Finland has abstained from all kinds of involvement. It had chosen two main methods in dealing with this matter: impartiality and abstention. During the preliminary period of the conference Finland has abstained from involvement because its “military, economic and political power is not a European problem”. Impartiality, she considered, followed logically from her policy of neutrality. Finland went even further and recognized that it was the responsibility of the big powers to settle the international differences and clear the way to a security conference. But when the situation changed, becoming clear the fact that the conference will take place, Finland’s attitude also changed, considering that her point of view and her interests must be represented and heard, since the decisions of such a conference would deeply influence the destinies of all countries involved. (O Apunen, 1971: 1-2) The initial 1954 Soviet proposal for a security conference had been accepted by Finland, but the conference did not take place and Finland was happy for it. The initial acceptance did not mean that Finland was among the initiators and the strong supports of such an action at that time (M. Jakobson, 1987: 101). But at the end of the 1960s the situation was different. In July 1969, President Kekkonen declared: “Finland has probed the possibility of holding a European security conference because a realistic examination of the problems of Europe is to Finland’s advantage, because in view of our known and recognized position of neutrality we have the prerequisites for making such a suggestion, and because we consider the time favorable. We in Finland in no way exaggerate our chances, but we should like to offer our assistance, if this assistance is generally considered to be of use”.


Finland had an important part in promoting the opening of the CSCE. The Finnish government declared several times that Finland considered useful the convocation of a minutely prepared conference in order to debate the problem of the European security. The Finnish government also declared that it agrees that all interesting states to participate in the conference, without previous conditions, every participant having the right to express its point of view and to make proposals for the European problems (R. Neagu, 1976: 86). In its memorandum of 5 May 1969 the Finnish government expressed its will to organize preparatory talks for the conference and suggested the capital of Finland for the summit meeting, if the participating states would accept the invitation. It was this initiative that kicked off the talks, leading to the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE at Dipoli, near Helsinki three years later. Most Western states originally suspected that the Finnish initiative had been directly inspired by Moscow and was yet more evidence of
Finland’s ‘Finlandization’. But Finns had their own good reasons to launch their appeal. The initiative was primarily designed to ease Soviet pressure on Finnish neutrality and to deal with the pending question of recognition of the two German states. The conference itself was for a long time not the main ambition of Finnish foreign policy. Offering Helsinki as a host to the talks and thereby making neutrality an indispensable condition for convening the security conference became the main element in Finland’s strategy towards the Soviet Union in the years 1969 to 1972. Finland had a very realistic attitude towards the CSCE. Ketjo Korhonen, the assistant of Risto Hyyrinen, the Foreign Ministry’s Political Director from 1967 to 1972, wrote 30 years after these events: “We were of course not so foolish that we had believed in May 1969 that the circular of the Finnish government would achieve some kind of a conference. At the most we would be able to organize some kind of a diplomatic tea party in Helsinki” (T. Fischer, 2008: 419-430). Not only Western countries feared that Finland followed Soviet directives, but also Romania and its leaders.

4. Romania’s perception of Finland’s participation in the CSCE

At the basis of the Romanian perception of Finland’s intentions and position in the CSCE were the Romanian analyses of the Finnish-Soviet Relations. Romania appreciated that Finland had a special relation with the Soviet Union, based on the 1948 mutual treaty. In 1971, in the joint Finnish-Romanian communiqué following Ceausescu’s visit in Finland, there has been inserted a wording according to which Ceausescu “has appreciated the last efforts of Finland to promote her policy of neutrality in the benefit of international peace and security in Europe”. (AMAE, Problema 220/1975, Finlansa-RSR, file 2058, 60-61) This is quite a vague wording and implies not only the fact that Romania started to have some confidence in the Finnish policy of neutrality, but also the fact that by that moment this policy needed, in Romania’s opinion improvement.

Romania and Romanian leaders at the beginning of the CSCE process perceived Finland as being the instrument of the Soviet interests and actions and consequently were very cautious towards Finland’s attitude and proposals in the conference. Valentin Lipatti, the head of the Romanian delegation in the CSCE wrote in 1997 “our host was very attentive to their powerful Eastern neighbor”. This is way the Romanian delegation, according to Lipatti, asked for the conference to be organized according to the principles of rotation. Romanians feared that Helsinki was a more favorable place for the Soviets to impose their will, with the Americans’ blessing. (V. Lipatti, 1997: 48-51) Romanian was especially against the idea that the second phase of the conference to be held in Helsinki, where the Soviet pressures were so visible in their perception (V. Lipatti, 1999: 58-60). The Romanian leaders interpreted the close relations between Finland and the Soviet Union as a confirmation of their fears. In July 1973, Paul Niculescu-Mizil supported this perception with an example: “I had the task to make a call at party level in Finland not long ago and I remained profoundly sad by the forms in which the interference in internal affairs of the Finnish Communist Party was manifesting. It is outright, comrades, only it is not called interference, but anyone can see what is going out, when official [Soviet] delegations come and go and just give directives, interfere in the affairs of the party or support the existence of some factions”. (Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of CC of RCP, of 2 July 1973, ANIC, Folder CC of RCP, Cancelarie [Office], from 2nd of July 1973, File 120/1973, 22-119) The Romanian leaders complained that the Finnish communist party was under Soviet pressure. This was for them one of the proof that Finland and Finnish government were also under Soviet pressure. Considering that Finland was under the pressure of the SU, Romanian was against the idea that whole conference to be organized in Helsinki, and especially its second and more important stage (V. Lipatti, 1999: 58-60). Concerning the place for the second stage of the CSCE, Helsinki was not an acceptable solution for Romania
for another reason, too. According to Valentin Lipatti, Mircea Balanescu and Constantin Vlad, in October 1973 many occidental delegates and also the Romanian ones considered that this solution was the result of an understanding between USSR and USA. (M. Balanescu, V. Lipatti, C. Vlad’s telegram no. 035.080 of 29.10.1973 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 241/1973-9.S.7, File 5142, f. 91) Accepting such an agreement would have meant that Romania and the other small and middle countries renounced to a position of principle and let the great powers to decide for the rest of the world.

Romanian leaders’ attitude towards Finland evolved in time. At the beginning of the process they were convinced that Finland would support the Soviet points of view towards the conference, but towards the ending of the conference they started to see Finland as one of the small countries that had its own objectives and supported many of the Romanian proposals and proposals. In February 1975 Romania, through her diplomats and leaders, considered Finland’s role in the CSCE as being very important: “the Finnish government gave a significant contribution to the convocation of the preparatory meeting and to conference’s preparation. It also made efforts for all European states, USA and Canada to participate in the conference” (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no. 032.165 of 8.02.1975 to Constantin Oancea, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 9); in Geneva, “the Finnish delegation has a positive role acting in order to accelerate the conference’s proceedings and the enactment of general-accepted solutions” (Ibid.: 10); in Geneva “the Romanian and Finnish delegations had frequent consultations and discussions and a very good cooperation. The two delegations sought general acceptable solutions and support each other in promoting these solutions”. (Ibid.: 10)

Valentin Lipatti, the head of the Romanian delegation, considered that, although the Finnish delegation avoided a very active attitude in the CSCE, it nevertheless supported the efforts of the small and middle states in order to make possible the enactment of the principles of the international relations. The Finnish delegation presented detailed proposals concerning the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Her proposal has been at the basis of the principles’ text elaborated within the conference. The Finnish delegation also supported Romania’s proposals concerning the political, economic, juridical and cultural measures, meant to make effective the refrain from the use of force and threat with the use of force. (Ibid. f.10) But, in the difficult matters such as maintaining the responsibility of the great powers in world politics or the changing of the frontiers through peaceful means, or the interdependence among principles Finland expressed no position. (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.554 of 26.04.1975 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 18) The Romanian and Finnish parts had similar positions also in the issues concerning the military aspects of security, and supported concrete measures for disarmament and military disengagement in Europe, such as notification of military large-scale maneuvers. (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.165 of 8.02.1975 to Constantin Oancea, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 10-11) But, Finland did not have an active attitude in promoting these proposals. (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.554 of 26.04.1975 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 18)

Lipatti considered that in the field of cultural and economic cooperation, the Finnish delegation, “without being very active, presented some solutions of compromise and contributed to the settlement of some complicated issues concerning cultural cooperation, exchanges in the field of education and information and enlargement of the human contacts”. Lipatti appreciated that Finland has a very important role as mediator in these matters between the divergent positions of USSR on the one hand and the EEC countries on the other. (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.165 of 8.02.1975 to Constantin Oancea, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 11) Romania and Finland often worked together in order to find this kind of compromise solutions in the field of cultural cooperation or in
finding general acceptable solutions in the field of economic cooperation (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.554 of 26.04.1975 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 20). “Although in the human contacts field Finland supports the western points of view, she hesitates to express her position and favors the negotiations for solving the problems”. (Ibid.: 19)

There is a great difference between the reports sent from Helsinki to Bucharest in 1975 and the perceptions Romanians had when the conference started. This is a new confirmation that Finland was among the victorious countries in this conference. She accomplished her goals and even the suspicious Romanians were convinced by the end of the conference that Finland was indeed a neutral state that “supports the Western points of view”, without the possibility of being very active, that Finland “is a successful mediator between East and West, especially between the EEC and the USSR”, Finland had her own interests in the CSCE and many aims in common with Romania, she acted as a neutral state.

This new attitude does not mean that Romania changed completely the way she perceived the Finnish-Soviet relations. She only started to understand Finland’s position from Finland’s point of view. Romania and Finland were in some respects in similar situation, they had to deal with the pressure of a powerful neighbor. Thus Romania’s attitude in the last stages of the CSCE towards Finland became more nuanced although the Soviet pressures continued to be linked with the Finnish foreign policy. Romania appreciated that the political relations between the Soviet Union and Finland were influenced at the beginning of the 1970s especially by their economic relations. In March 1975, Constantin Vlad appreciated that Finnish economy was over-much dependent of the Soviet Union, especially in terms of energy. “Since Finland’s economic dependence of the Soviet energy was increasing, there was expected the political dependence to increase too”. As a consequence, Vlad wrote in 1975, “a series of the Finnish initiatives had the mark of the Soviet influence: the renewal of Kekkonen’s idea to create a demilitarized zone in Northern Europe, Finland’s position in the CSCE, Soviet interference in Finnish internal affairs” (Constantin’s Vlad’s telegram no. 036.123 of 11.03.1975 to Vasile Gliga, AMAE, Problema 220/1975, Finlanda, file 2069, 3-5).

Analyzing the Finnish policy trends, the Romanian officials appreciated in March 1975 that the official Finnish circles will continue to strengthen Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union as a result of the next factors: the existence of the Finnish-Soviet 1948 treaty; the close personal relations Kekkonen had with the Soviet leaders; the interest of the Finnish politicians in gaining Moscow’s favorable attitude; the majority of the Finnish political parties – ‘including the leadership of the Finnish Social Democratic Party that had had a more dignified attitude towards the USSR’ – supported the idea of a close and even closer relation with the USSR and made efforts to get closer to the Soviets; the economic circles supported the special relations with the USSR; the leading officers of the Finnish army were for a pro-Soviet orientation of the country in her foreign policy’. According to Constantin Vlad, ‘it is expected that Finland will strengthen her relations with some socialist countries, especially with Poland. The conclusion is that that ‘the general orientation of the Finnish foreign policy is towards USSR and this orientation will continue for a long time’ (Constantin’s Vlad’s telegram no. 036.124 of 11.03.1975 to Vasile Gliga, AMAE, Problema 220/1975, Finlanda, File 2069, 9-11).

The Romanian Embassy in Moscow sent similar opinion as a response to the request of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, underlining the idea that ‘it is known the close positions of the two countries in the CSCE’. Gheorghe Bradus, informed the minister that among the factors that favor the close Finnish-Soviet relations are the next ones: on the one hand Finland’s interest to have good relations with a militarily powerful neighbor, to develop her exterior commerce and to get energetic resources from the USSR, and on the other Soviets’ interest to prove this model of relations with a capitalist country (Gheorghe Bradus’s
Finland and Romania supported together the idea of a continuation organism of the conference, although Finland was for a fix headquarters of this organism. Romania wanted the continuation conferences to be organized through rotation in all the participating states. 

(Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.165 of 8.02.1975 to Constantin Oancea, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 11-12) Finland hoped the headquarters to be established in Helsinki. (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.554 of 26.04.1975 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 19) In Romania’s perception a very positive point for the Finnish delegation was that it supported the idea of clear, ample and committing documents. It also acted among the neutral and non-aligned countries proposing solutions of compromise preoccupied to satisfy the interests and positions of all the participating states. In Lipatti’s view the Finnish delegations does not act actively and insistently to promote different solutions because “it does not wish to contradict other countries, considering that Finland is one of the hosts of the conference”. (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no.032.554 of 26.04.1975 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 220/1975-Finlanda, File 2068, 17) The phrase is from a top secret telegram and not from a public document and thus there was no need for the Romanian diplomat to use a “diplomatically correct language”. Thus means that he did not thing that Finland’s attitude was explained by the Soviet pressures, but by her own purposes and objectives.

Romania came in Helsinki with a strategy for achieving her goals, namely to try to win the support of some small and middle states for equilibrating the balance with the great political and military powers of that time. Suspicious of the intentions of the other participants to the international system, Romania promoted a foreign policy orientated to the regimentation of the international system, stressing the importance of some international law principles. Among the directives for the Romanian delegation at the CSCE, an important one was that “to act in order to obtain support for Romanian proposals”. “The delegation will establish contacts and consultations with those delegations that seem favorable to the Romanian proposals in order to obtain their support in promoting those proposals or to persuade them to present proposals similar to ours’ (The completion of the directives for the Romanian delegation to the preparatory reunion of CSCE, stage III, Helsinki, 15.01.1973, ANIC, Folder CC of RCP, Cancelarie, File 2/1973, 37-38). This is way Romania was very preoccupied with Finland’s attitude in the CSCE, a neutral country which could influence other small and middle countries in the sense of her proposals. Romanian delegates at the CSCE indirectly appreciated that this objective has been reached. In October 1973 in a telegram sent from Geneva to Bucharest, Valenti Lipatti wrote: “small and middle countries of NATO and EEC react more actively at the pressures of the USA which want them to abstain from approaching the matter of the military aspects of security. These states are influenced in some degree also by the position of the neutral and non-aligned states such as Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Many occidental delegates have told us that they have informed in positive reports their capitals about the Romanian proposals and asked for permission to support our proposals, especially our proposals concerning the military aspects of security. The Finnish delegation supported Romanian and Yugoslav proposals on this matter” (Valentin Lipatti’s telegram no. 031188 of 26.10.1973 to George Macovescu, AMAE, Problema 241/1973-9.S.7, File 5126, 65-67). Thus, the way Romania perceived Finland is important from two points of view. On the one hand it determined the strategy of Romania in her bilateral relations with Finland in the CSCE process and on the other hand it is a measure of the success of the Finnish policy of active neutrality in the CSCE and in international relations in general in those years.
5. Conclusions

Romania and Romanian leaders perceived Finland and Finland’s attitude in the CSCE from the perspective of Finnish-Soviet relations. Although at the beginning of the process Romanians were very suspicious towards Finland seeing it as an instrument of the Soviet policy, in time this attitude nuanced. Although the Finnish-Soviet relation were still considered as very important in the foreign policy of Finland, during the CSCE Romania has started to understand Finnish positions from a different perspective. Finland stopped of being seen as a Soviets’ instrument without own will, despite its special relations with the Soviet Union. Romanian delegates and diplomats understood that Finnish-Soviet relations will continue to be close and even closer, but they also understood that Finland was seeking its own way of surviving in a dual system. Appreciating the success of Finland in the CSCE, Romanians practically confirmed that Finland reached her aims in this conference: the confirmation of her active neutrality in international relations.

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